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aided by the findings of the Medical Board, which is com-
posed of medical experts," although it is true that Medical
Board findings are not binding on the Commission. How-
ever, even in cases not heard by the Board, or where the
Board is reversed, it is apparent that effective investigation,
adjudication and settlement of industrial accident claims
requires that the Commission's actions be final insofar as
is possible.2' The instant decision supports this policy.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON CHANGE OF
VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES
Heslop v. State'
The appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County of assault with intent to rob and
assault and battery. The indictment also charged three
other offenses for which he was acquitted. None of the
five offenses2 charged carried a possible capital sentence,
but at least the former one3 of the two for which he was
convicted carried a possible sentence to the State Peni-
tentiary. Prior to being tried he filed a request for re-
moval of his trial to another county, relying on the statute
of 1952,' which had amended the relevant Code Section 5
Supra, n. 1, 850.
"The object of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to furnish a
prompt, continuous and expert method for dealing with a class of ques-
tions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determina-
tion by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task."
Supra, n. 1, 850; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 46 (1932).
It should be observed, however, that the same statutory rule of adminis-
trative finality does not apply to findings of the Maryland Commission in
cases involving an accidental personal injury as distinguished from an
occupational disease. "The statutory burden of proof that the commission's
decision was incorrect is a burden of persuasion, which may be sustained
by satisfying the jury from the same evidence on which the commission
made its decision." Paul Const. Co. v. Powell, 88 A. 2d 837, 845 (Md., 1952).
"Whatever incongruity there may be in review by a jury of the presump-
tively correct decision of an administrative body supposed to be 'informed
by experience', only the legislature can correct. Apparently only in Mary-
land, Ohio, Oregon, and Oklahoma are such administrative decisions re-
viewable by a jury.. . ." Ibid.
295 A. 2d 880 (Md., 1953).
Robbery, assault with intent to rob, assault and battery, larceny and re-
ceiving stolen goods. Ibid, 880.
Assault with intent to rob.
'Md. Laws 1952, Ch. 69.
Md. Code (1951), Art. 75, Sec. 109.
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(passed in pursuance of the applicable State Constitutional
provision) .6
This statute, if constitutional, entitled him to an ab-
solute right of removal, in any case involving a possible
penitentiary sentence. Prior to the 1952 amendment, a
defendant was entitled to an absolute right of removal only
in capital cases, and was required to show cause, which in
this case he did not attempt to do, in order to obtain a re-
moval in other criminal cases. He claimed advantage of
the 1952 amendment and the right to a removal without
showing cause.
The trial court denied his request for removal and ruled
that the 1952 statute was unconstitutional, because it was
beyond the power of the Legislature to extend the absolute
right of removal to other than capital cases, which this
was not.
Defendant then indicated that he wished to take an
immediate appeal from that ruling, but the court advised
him that he could not appeal at that point, whereupon the
case went to trial and, after conviction on two of the
counts, the appeal was taken, assigning as error the trial
court's refusal to grant the motion for removal, and its
holding that the 1952 law was unconstitutional. The Court
of Appeals affirmed.
Two things are incidentally related to the court's ruling.
In a companion case, the Criminal Court of Baltimore City,
in State v. Scarlett7 also held the 1952 statute unconstitu-
tional, so that, regardless of appeal, its ruling was ratified
by the appellate opinion in the Heslop case. Also, the 1953
Legislature, by a law8 passed just ahead of the ruling in
the Heslop case, further amended the 1952 statute, to clarify
its meaning by providing that the court should grant the
absolute right of removal only for those crimes where a
penitentiary sentence was provided in the particular penal
statute concerning the very offence, rather than under a
general statute permitting alternative sentences to dif-
ferent penal institutions for any and all crimes. Of course,
this amendment is no more constitutional than the 1952
statute that was amended and intended to be clarified.
The Court's ruling as to the unconstitutionality of the
1952 statute is easily explained, in the light of the Con-
stitutional history in the matter. But for that, it might be
* Md. Const. (1867), Art. 4, Sec. 8.
7 Baltimore Daily Record, Dec. 12, 1952.
a Md. Laws 1953, Ch. 503.
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criticised on the ground that the latest Constitutional pro-
vision merely meant to give Constitutional sanction to the
absolute right of removal as far as expressed, i.e., in capital
cases, and to permit the Legislature to go farther in the
matter if they chose, as they tried to do in 1952.
While apparently there was no mention of change of
venue in the original State Constitution of 1776, yet soon
the need for dealing with it became apparent, for, by an
amendment' to that Constitution taking effect in 1806, it
was provided that the trial court should have a discre-
tionary right to remove all criminal cases, upon suggestion
in writing to the court that the trial in the initial county
could not be had on a fair and impartial basis. Then, the
next State Constitution of 185110 changed this by elimi-
nating the court's discretionary power, and by giving an
absolute power of removal in every criminal case upon
mere request to the court, as ultimately came to be the
present rule and practice in capital cases only.
By the time of the Convention of 1864 it was felt that the
absolute or unlimited right of removal had been grossly
abused so as to delay justice, and, accordingly, the Con-
stitution of 186411 returned the power of removal to the
court's discretion, providing the same rule for all cases,
as under the amendment of 1806.12 Shortly afterwards, the
now current constitution of 186713 restored the absolute
right of removal in all cases.
Soon after that it again became apparent that the ab-
solute right of removal in all cases was being abused, and
then, by a proposed Constitutional amendment14 which was
approved and took effect in 1875, the present Constitutional
provision was put in force, whereby a compromise was
adopted. This was that there should still be the absolute
right of removal, without showing cause, in civil and
capital cases, but that it should be necessary to make a
showing of cause, i.e., the inability to obtain a fair and im-
partial trial, in other (non-capital) criminal cases.
Apparently, in 1952,1' the Legislature thought that it
had become unfair not to grant an absolute right of removal
in the more serious, though non-capital criminal cases, and
9 Md. Laws 1804, Ch. 55, confirmed, Md. Laws 1805, Ch. 16.
10 Md. Const. (1851), Art. 4, Sec. 28.
u Md. Const. (1864), Art. 4, Sec. 9.
Supra, n. 9.
Supra, n. 6 (before amendment, n. 14, infra).




it attempted to change the law in terms of the difference
between penitentiary offenses and those carrying less than
a penitentiary sentence. The Legislature thus ignored the
traditional distinction between felony and misdemeanor,
no doubt recognizing that the Maryland technique of dis-
tinguishing felonies from misdemeanors is a very un-in-
telligent one.'" As had been done for other purposes, 7 that
distinction was disregarded in favor of the more realistic
one of penitentiary-type offenses and lesser ones.
No doubt the Legislature also had in mind the paradox
of the Maryland procedure as it then stood, that there was
no absolute right of removal, but only one granted upon a
showing of cause, in very serious though non-capital crimi-
nal cases, whereas the law and practice was and still is
that in all civil cases' at law there is an absolute right of
removal without showing any cause. Thus it was and now
is under the Court's ruling, the law that a man may be
tried for a most serious criminal offense, carrying a heavy,
long sentence to the penitentiary, and will not obtain a
change of venue unless he can make a showing of cause,
but if he be sued on a grocery bill for a few hundred dollars
in a court of record he may obtain a change of venue as of
right. This has long been one of the many paradoxes of
Maryland procedure, and will continue to be unless and
until a constitutional amendment may make possible the
absolute riglt of change of venue in serious crimes, as
the 1952 Legislature tried to accomplish. The effect of the
Court's ruling is to require a Constitutional amendment to
do so.
Historically speaking, the power of a court to grant a
change of venue to get rid of local prejudices has been
recognized since the common law of England. In our
country the courts of other states have held this right so
16 Whereas in many other States the test for distinguishing a felony from
a misdemeanor is the relative amount of possible penalty for the offense,
e.g., more or less than one year's imprisonment, or imprisonment In the State
Penitentiary as against other lesser institutions, this Is not so in Maryland.
The local rule is that a crime is a misdemeanor unless it was a felony at
common law, or carries a mandatory death penalty (no crimes do so), or
has been explicitly made a felony by the Legislature; Dutton v. State, 123
Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914). As a result, many serious crimes may be only
misdemeanors, as in the Dutton case, under which, until the statute was
recently amended, attempted rape was only a misdemeanor despite the fact
that it carried an (optional) death penalty; Md. Code (1951), Art. 27, Sec. 14.
11 E.g., for the concurrent criminal jurisdiction of justices of the peace
under Md. Code (1951), Art. 52, See. 13, and for the general one year statute
of limitations on criminal prosecutions under Md. Code (1951), Art. 57,
Sec. 11.
1Md. Const. (1867), Art. 4, Sec. 8.
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fundamental that they have applied it without reliance
upon constitutional or statutory authority.19
The object of these provisions for the removal of causes
from one venue to another is to secure a fair and impartial
trial and promote the ends of justice by eliminating the
influence of some local prejudice which might operate
detrimentally upon the interests or rights of one or the
other of the parties to a suit.2" The purpose is not to avoid
a judge, and filing a motion on such grounds has been held
in contempt of court.21 Thus, in non-jury cases such as
those in equity,2 2 mandamus proceedings at law,23 and
condemnation proceedings,24 the right of removal is not
recognized.
Beyond the paradox of having an absolute right of re-
moval in all civil cases at law, mentioned above, there are
other interesting phases of the Maryland procedure on
change of venue. First is that, in Maryland, the State has
a right to remove a criminal case,25 co-equal with that of
the defendant, and under exactly the same circumstances,
i.e., as of right in capital cases, or upon the showing of
cause in non-capital ones. No doubt the State would have
had the similar right in penitentiary sentence cases under
the 1952 law had it not been held unconstitutional.
This is perhaps a minority view in this country, for we
usually think of change of venue as a privilege in the de-
fendant to be free from prejudices against him, reflecting
the unusually high regard for the defendant's rights in
criminal cases. We usually think of the defendant as having
a right to be tried by a jury of his peers in the locality where
his crime was committed. But, just as Maryland has equally
allowed the State to pray a jury trial or to appeal from a
magistrate's acquittal,6 so it allows the State a change of
19 State v. Dashiell, 6 Har. & J. 268 (1824) ; Price v. State, 8 Gill 295
(1849); Negro Jerry v. Townshend, 2 Md. 274, 278 (1852); Crocker v.
Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N. E. 369 (1911) ; State v.
Albee, 61 N. H. 423, 60 Am. Rep. 325 (1881) ; Barry v. Truax, 13 N. D. 131,
99 N. W. 769 (1904).
0Negro Jerry v. Townshend, ibid.; Wright v. Hamner, 5 Md. 370 (1854);
Griffin v. Leslie, 20 Md. 15, 18 (1863); Cooke v. Cooke, 41 Md. 362 (1875).
21Ex Parte Bowles, 164 Md. 318, 165 A. 169 (1933).
"Cooke v. Cooke, supra, n. 20; Belair Social, etc. Club v. State, 74 Md. 297,
22 A. 68 (1891) ; Co. Commrs. Charles Co. v. Wilmer, 131 Md. 175, 101 A.
686 (1917).
"Baltimore v. Llbowitz, 159 Md. 28, 149 A. 449 (1930); Baltimore v.
Krupnick, 159 Md. 39, 149 A. 454 (1930).
2
4 M. & C. C. of Baltimore v. Kane, 125 Md. 135, 93 A. 393 (1915).
"Md. onst. (1867), Art. 4, Sec. 8.
'On which see Note, Still Further on Appeals by the State in Criminal
Cases, 12 Md. L. Rev. 68 (1951).
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venue under exactly the same circumstances. This is
allowed the State under the Constitutional provision which,
of course, obviates any objection that might be found in the
constitutional provisions of other States which only allow
the defendant a removal in pursuance of the traditional
common law attitude in the matter.
Furthermore, and incidentally mentioned in the Heslop2
case, is the problem of the time of appeal from a ruling of
a trial court on a petition for change of venue. As indicated
above, the defendant wanted to appeal immediately from
the trial court's ruling, but was told that he could not do so
until after a conviction, and he did wait until then. By
dictum,2" the Court of Appeals affirmed this, and quoted
the rule of Lee v. State,29 to the effect that there is no
appeal from a ruling on change of venue until the end of
the case at trial, save in the exceptional situation of a
complete denial of any change of venue in a case where
there is a constitutional right to it without showing cause."0
This was pointed out in this case to be limited to capital
charges, despite the attempt of the 1952 Legislature to pro-
vide otherwise. So this case affords an interesting foot-
note to the celebrated Lee case which had involved the
point of immediate appealability. It will be remembered
that in the Lee case the Court of Appeals dismissed the
untimely appeal by Lee, who was dissatisfied with the
locality to which his requested change of venue had been
granted. He was complaining that he would not receive a
fair trial there, either, but the Court dismissed the appeal,
stating they had no power to rule in the matter. However,
it did lay down a very broad hint to the trial court that it
would be desirable for the court, of its own motion, as it
had power to do, to strike out its order and to substitute a
new order sending the case to a much more clearly impar-
tial locality. The trial court did that, and the case went on
to a new locality for trial in orderly fashion, which even-
tually led to an affirmed conviction and execution of sen-
tence.
While conceding the correctness of the Court's opinion
on the constitutional point as it now stands, yet in view of
the attitude of two recent legislatures, it would seem de-
sirable to propose a Constitutional amendment allowing the
-95 A. 2d 880 (Md., 1953).
" Since the appeal was from the final judgment; ibid, 881.




voters of the State to decide whether the right of absolute
change of venue should be extended beyond capital cases
to the more serious non-capital cases, as was the object of
the 1952 legislation, held to be unconstitutional because
the Court felt that the 1875 amendment froze the matter
in that regard pending further constitutional amendment.
It would seem that the Heslop ruling is an obvious in-
terpretation, in view of the fact that the purpose of so
amending the Constitution in 1875 was to put an end to
what were then regarded as abuses of the unlimited right
of removal. It may be now that newly arisen factors make
other changes in order seventy-five years and more after
that amendment.
Thus it is that, as the law now stands, while there is an
absolute right of removal in all civil law cases, there is such
a right only in capital criminal cases, and cause must be
shown and the matter left to discretion of the trial court,
subject to review for abuse, in non-capital criminal cases,
howsoever serious the crime and severe its punishment.
DRIVER HAVING GREEN LIGHT - DUTY
OF CARE
Valench v. Belle Isle Cab Co.'
The plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant Lee's
taxicab, which was eastbound on Lombard Street in Balti-
more City, at the intersection of Light Street. The cab was
standing directly to the south of a streetcar, both vehicles
waiting for the traffic signal to change to green. Lee's vision
to the north on the intersecting street was obscured by the
streetcar, and he could not see the defendant Medlin's auto
which was headed south on Light Street. Lee testified that
he waited for the amber light to clear, and started to move
when the green came on. He was in the act of passing the
streetcar when he was struck by Medlin's auto, and he
testified that he first saw Medlin's auto when it was inches
away, and right before the collision occurred. There was
testimony in the record, not referred to in the opinion, that
Medlin's auto was three feet into the intersection when the
light changed, but this was contradicted by other witnesses
who said Medlin entered the intersection on a red light.
As a result of the collision, the plaintiff was injured and
1 75 A. 2d 97 (Md., 1950).
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